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NOTES
RETHINKING RETROACTIVITY
I. INTRODUCTION

Under the stringent test set forth in Teague v. Lane,' defendants
convicted of criminal offenses are generally unable to collaterally attack their convictions by invoking constitutional rules of criminal procedure announced after their convictions become final. 2 The purported exception to this general principle is said to require that a new
constitutional rule be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty ' 3 for it
to be applied to criminal cases decided before its pronouncement.
Once a rule of criminal procedure is characterized as "new,"4 Teague
prohibits the rule's invocation in habeas proceedings unless the rule
both "assure[s] that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure
which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be
convicted"5 and "alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural
6
elements that . . . vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.
Although the contemporary Court has promulgated a series of constitutional rules of criminal procedure said to represent a "sea change"
from prior jurisprudence, it has simultaneously concluded that no new
rule meets the terms of this exception.7 Indeed, although Justices have
variously described recent rules as "deeply ingrained in .. .the Anglo-

1 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
2 Id. at 305-10 (plurality opinion); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241 (I99O) (describing the narrowness of the exception for retroactive application of new rules of criminal procedure).
3 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (1989) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 ('97')
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 The definition of "new" law under Teague has been described as encompassing "considerable
breadth," and several Justices have lamented that the notion is so sweeping that "a state prisoner
can secure habeas relief only by showing that the state court's rejection of the constitutional challenge was so clearly invalid under then-prevailing legal standards that the decision could not be
defended by any reasonable jurist." RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID
L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1331 ( 5 th ed. 2003) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM] (quoting
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 417-18 (199o) (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
5 Teague, 489 U.S. at 312 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
6 Id. at 311 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-94 (Harlan, J., concurring in
the judgments in part and dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7 Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty
Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1103 (2001).
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American system of jurisprudence,"8 a "prerequisiteto reliability,"9 and
"constitutional[ly] imperative,"'10 no rule of criminal procedure has yet
survived the modern test for retroactive application in a collateral proceeding. 1 Scholars have lamented the narrowness of the Teague exception, arguing that "the Court's refusal to relax Teague's strictures"
has produced "disturbing" consequences. 2 Indeed, the Teague plurality itself acknowledged that the emergence of new rules that would
'13
satisfy the criteria for retroactivity was "unlikely.
This Note takes up Justice Harlan's admonition that "[rietroactivity must be rethought."'1 4 In Part II, the Note begins by tracing the
jurisprudential font of Teague's test for retroactivity - the reasoning
of Justice Harlan's opinions in Desist v. United States 15 and Mackey v.
United States,16 which the Teague Court explicitly adopted in articulating the test for retroactive application of procedural rules.' 7 The
Note argues that Justice Harlan's concerns in Mackey did not include
the normative considerations that properly govern the retroactive application of new rules on collateral review. Because Mackey's concern
with what is "fundamental' 8 is as analytically unavailing in the habeas context as it was during the incorporation debate, the Note argues that the Court should avoid reliance on Mackey's analysis and instead focus on Justice Harlan's emphasis in Desist on constitutional
rules of criminal procedure that substantially enhance the accuracy of
judgments of conviction.
Because Justice O'Connor's opinion in Teague anticipated the problematic indeterminacy of Mackey's analysis, 19 the Note argues that
8 Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S.

430,

445 (I98I) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S.

184, 187 (1957)).

9 Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 248 (199o) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Gilmore v. Taylor, 5o8 U.S. 333, 358 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11 None of the twelve rules of criminal procedure that the Court has considered for retroactive
application on federal habeas has ever been held retroactively available. See, e.g., Schriro v.
Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2522, 2526 (2004) (declining to apply retroactively on collateral review the rule of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which requires that aggravating factors necessary to impose the death penalty be found by a jury); see also United States v. Mandanici, 205
F.3 d 519, 529 (2d Cir. 2ooo) (describing eleven previous Supreme Court rulings that denied retroactive effect to new rules of criminal procedure).
12 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
'0

Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1817 (199).
13 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 33 (989).
14 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
15

Id. at

262.

16 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in
part).
17 Teague, 489 U.S. at 292.
18 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 689, 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting
in part).
19 Teague, 489 U.S. at 312.
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Teague should be understood to require far more emphasis on Desist's
test: whether an accuracy-enhancing procedural rule is among those
"without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
diminished. ' 20 The Note examines the Court's decisions after Teague
and concludes that it is the extent to which a rule improves accuracy,
and not amorphous concerns with respect to what is "fundamental,"
that has motivated the Court's refusal to apply new rules retroactively
on collateral review. Because no rule addressed by the Court has unambiguously improved the likelihood that a conviction is accurate, the
Note argues, the Court since Teague has appropriately refused to apply
any new rule of criminal procedure retroactively.
In Part III, the Note turns to Apprendi v. New Jersey,21 which held
that the Sixth Amendment requires that "any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime" be proved
both to a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt. 2I The Note argues
that, by raising the quantum of proof necessary for the state to insulate
a conviction from constitutional attack, Apprendi's reasonable doubt
rule by definition increases the likelihood that a particular conviction
was accurate. For this reason the Note concludes, consistent with Justice Harlan's conception of habeas, that Apprendi's reasonable doubt
holding demands retroactive application.
Finally, the Note responds to arguments set forth by the eight federal courts of appeals that have rejected habeas claims based on the
23
retroactive application of Apprendi's reasonable doubt requirement.
The Note concludes that these holdings are a symptom of the doctrinal
confusion that necessarily attends any jurisprudence that relies upon
individual judges' conceptions of those rights that are fundamental.
All of the court5 of appeals to consider the issue, however, agree that
Apprendi's rulf significantly and unambiguously improves the accuracy of each defendant's punishment.2 4 If the purpose of the Great
Writ is to be properly understood as ensuring "the freedom of the subject, '2 S the Note concludes, the federal courts cannot impose finality
upon a punishment that does not have the benefit of such a rule.

20 Id.

at 313.

U.S. 466 (2oo0).
Id. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
23 See, e.g., Coleman v. United States, 329 F.3 d 77, 90 (2d Cir. 2003); see also id. (collecting cases).
24 Cf. id. at 88 (holding that even the improved accuracy that Apprendi's rule may provide
does not trigger retroactive application).
25 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 5o9 n.20 (953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Cox v.
21 530
22

Hakes, 15 A.C. 506, 515 (H.L. 189o)).
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II. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
RETROACTIVITY JURISPRUDENCE

Although Teague itself is of relatively recent vintage, its test for collateral retroactivity remains mired in nearly fifty years of confusion at
the Court. Because Teague draws its two-pronged test from Justice
Harlan's opinions at the outset of this debate, 6 the concerns that motivated those opinions are helpful in determining whether Teague's approach is consistent with Justice Harlan's conceptualization of habeas.
A. The Genealogy of Teague v. Lane
Before 1963, prisoners were generally unable to assert collateral
claims based on constitutional rules announced after their convictions
- not because of the law of retroactivity, but because they were
deemed to have procedurally defaulted these claims by failing to raise
them on direct review. However, in Fay v. Noia,27 the Court held that
procedural default of constitutional claims in state court did not bar
federal courts from reviewing those claims in habeas proceedings
unless the default involved a "deliberate by-passing of state procedures" by the prisoner herself. 28 Fay therefore marked the first time
that federal courts were required to determine whether a prisoner
could assert federal rights set forth in a decision announced after her

29
conviction became final.
I.
The Warren Court's Nonretroactivity Doctrine and Justice

Harlan's Dissent in Desist v. United States. - After Fay, the Court
struggled to balance the states' interests in the finality of their courts'
judgments of conviction against prisoners' interests in vindicating
their federal rights, issuing decisions in 1965 and 1966 addressing the
scope of collateral retroactivity.30 In 1967, however, in Stovall v.
Denno3 1 the Court appeared to settle on a three-pronged analysis governing questions of retroactivity on both direct and collateral review:
"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of
26
27
28
29

See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12 (1989).
372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Id. at 438-39.
See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 261 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that Fay

held "[flor the first time ...[that] a habeas petitioner could successfully attack his conviction collaterally despite the fact that the 'new' rule" did not exist at the time of the direct proceedings);
see also THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 1312 (describing the rise of habeas claims after Fay was decided).
30 Compare Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639-40 (1965) (holding that the rule of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (I96i), was retroactively unavailable to prisoners whose convictions were final
before Mapp was decided), with Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966) (holding that the
rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was retroactively available only to prisoners
whose trials began after Miranda was decided).
31 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and
(c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. '32 Perhaps most importantly, Stovall declared that "no distinction is justified between convictions now final
and convictions at various stages of trial and direct review.

...

'33

Although Justice Harlan had joined - apparently reluctantly the Court's earlier decisions limiting the retroactive availability of new
procedural rules, 34 he could no longer assent to the Court's refusal to
apply its own decisions on direct review. Thus, in October Term 1968,
Justice Harlan issued a stinging dissent in Desist v. United States exposing his dissatisfaction with the Stovall regime. 35 In Desist, the
Court held that a defendant could not invoke the rule of Katz v.
United States,36 which required that electronic surveillance be authorized by a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, either on direct or
collateral review.3 I The Court concluded that Katz "should be given
wholly prospective application,"38 noting that all three Stovall factors
counseled against retrospective application of Katz's rule. 39

Impor-

tantly, the Desist Court followed Stovall's assertion that cases on direct
review could not be distinguished from those in which the judgment of
conviction was already final, 40 holding that the "deterrent purpose of
the exclusionary rule and the reliance of law enforcement officers focus
upon the time of the search, not any subsequent point in the prosecu41
tion, as the relevant date" for retroactivity purposes.
Justice Harlan's dissent conveyed palpable frustration with the
Court's jurisprudence. "Retroactivity," he asserted, "must be rethought."42 Drawing on a Harvard Law Review article by Professor
Id. at 297.
33 Id. at 300.
34 Indeed, some commentators have concluded that Justice Harlan's participation in earlier
32

decisions refusing retroactive application of new procedural rules on direct review was a product
of his "short-term desire to limit the damage done by decisions that [he] thought 'fundamentally
unsound."' Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1739-40 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. 667, 676 (I97I) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part)).
35 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256, 258 (I969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
37 See Desist, 394 U.S. at 246, 252-54.
38 Id. at 246.
39 See id. at 249-54.
40 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1967).

41 Desist, 394 U.S. at 253.
42 Id. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Harlan first
objected that the Court's refusal to apply its new rules retroactively to cases on direct review
"would belie the truism that it is the task of this Court... to do justice to each litigant on the
merits of his own case." Id. at 259. This view eventually prevailed in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479
U.S. 314 (1987). In Griffith, Justice Blackmun explicitly adopted Justice Harlan's approach to
retroactivity on direct review: "In Justice Harlan's view, and now in ours, failure to apply a newly
declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of
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Paul Mishkin, Justice Harlan concluded that the central purpose of
habeas was to ensure that no person remained "incarcerated under a
procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent
will be convicted. '4 3 Professor Mishkin's Foreword argued that the
three lines of cases in which the Court had held rules of criminal procedure retroactively available - requiring the assistance of counsel,
mandating the availability of trial transcripts for the indigent, and
prohibiting the extraction of confessions in violation of due process all promoted the writ's role in "free[ing] prisoners as to whom there is
greater doubt than the Constitution allows that they have in fact done
the acts which constitute the crime for which they are being punished."

44

Professor Mishkin characterized the constitutional protections of
criminal procedure as mechanisms for ensuring a certain constitutionally required degree of confidence in the correctness of a conviction:
[I]t is at times useful to view the complex of all [procedural] guarantees
...as expressing... that degree of confidence that a man has committed a
crime which the Constitution requires as a condition of the state's depriv45
ing him of liberty or life.

Professor Mishkin's observations significantly influenced Justice
Harlan's thinking about the problem of retroactivity. 46 Professor

Mishkin's hypothesis offered a limiting principle for collateral retroactivity, providing a convincing alternative to the Blackstonian approach
that demanded full retroactive application of every constitutional holding on the theory that the Court discovered the law as it had always
existed.47 Thus, Justice Harlan concluded that the purpose of habeas
is to ensure "that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure
which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be
convicted." 48
2. Justice Harlan's Abrupt Reversal: Mackey v. United States. After Desist, the Court reconsidered its retroactivity doctrine in a seconstitutional adjudication." Id. at 322. This Note's principal concern, however, involves the
circumstances under which new rules should be retroactively available on collateral review, which
more squarely implicates concerns involving the finality of state court decisions.
43 Desist, 394 U.S. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court,
1964 Term-Foreword:The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79
HARV. L. REV. 56, 77-101 (I965)).
44 Mishkin, supra note 43, at 8o, 82-83.
45 Id. at 81-82 (emphasis added).
46 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1743 ("For Justice Harlan, the rethinking began with
an article by Paul Mishkin.... ').
47 See id. (noting that Justice Harlan "disavowed the Blackstonian theory that the law should
be taken to have always been what it is said to mean at a later time" (quoting Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (197) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in
part)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
48 Desist, 394 U.S. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

1648

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 118:1642

ries of three cases decided in I97I. In his opinion in Mackey v. United
States, Justice Harlan agreed with the Court that the rule of Chimel v.
California,49 which narrowed the scope of reasonable searches incident
to arrest, should not be made retroactive on collateral review. 5 0 Although the majority appeared to have drawn from his reasoning in
Desist, referring frequently to the "accuracy of the verdict of guilt returned" in its retroactivity analysis,5 1 Justice Harlan changed course,
noting that "reflection upon what [he] wrote in Desist" had persuaded
him that "those new rules cognizable on habeas ought to be defined,
not by the 'truth-determining' test, '5 2 but by an assessment of whether

the procedure was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. '5 3 Although Justice Harlan proffered three reasons explaining this shift, it is
clear that his desire to limit the availability of procedural rules he
thought unwise - rather than the federalism principles that motivated
his concerns in Fay and that properly govern collateral review 4
5
prompted this unfortunate shift.

First, Justice Harlan argued that "adherence to precedent," particularly Kaufman v. United Statess55 suggested that it was "not a principal purpose of the writ to inquire whether a criminal convict did in
fact commit the deed alleged. '5 6 In Kaufman, Justice Brennan had
taken the view that, because the sole purpose of post-conviction habeas was to give states incentives to abide prevailing constitutional
standards, application of new rules on collateral review was unnecessary. 57 Certainly this argument supports the view that the prisoner's
guilt is irrelevant to the retroactivity question. But this was never Justice Harlan's approach. Although the merits of Justice Brennan's argument have been debated at length,5 8 even in Mackey Justice Harlan
49 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
50 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 699-700 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments inpart and dissenting
in part).
51 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 675. It is a testament to Justice Harlan's influential jurisprudence that
the court of appeals had also measured Chimel's retroactivity in terms of "[t]he unreliability of the
fact-finding process," Mackey v. United States, 411 F.2d 504, 509 ( 7 th Cir. 1969), although the
controlling retroactivity opinion at the time, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (Brennan, J.),
made no mention of reliability as an indicia for retroactivity. See supra pp. 1645-46.
52 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in
part) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53 Id. at 693 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (I937) (Cardozo, J.)).
54 See supra note 34.
55 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
56 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in
part).
57 Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 225-27.
58 Although Justice Brennan's conception of the role of habeas as providing state courts with
incentives to enforce prevailing constitutional standards temporarily represented the view of the
Court, that view has fallen from favor among both jurists and scholars. See THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at I314-17. A normative assessment of
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remained convinced that the purpose of the writ was to correct constitutional error rather than to 5provide
incentives for state courts to en9
force constitutional strictures.
Justice Harlan's second reason for departing from Desist's analysis
in Mackey was equally unconvincing - but, perhaps, revealing. He
argued that experience had demonstrated "just how marginally effective are some new rules purportedly aimed at improving the factfinding process," and his opinion pointed to criminal procedure decisions
promulgated by the Warren Court and accompanied by unpersuasive
references to decisional accuracy. 60 Of course this is not a reason to
depart from retroactivity jurisprudence focused on accuracy; rather, it
is a reason to doubt whether the decisions in question were properly
motivated by accuracy concerns in the first instance - and to seek a
coherent approach for evaluating the accuracy-enhancing effect of a
new rule.
Finally -

and most ironically -

Justice Harlan noted that the dis-

tinction between rules designed to enhance accuracy and those designed to "further other values" was "inherently intractable," 6 1 perhaps
revealing a concern that retroactivity might hinge on the subjective
value preferences of a majority of the Justices of the Court. To stray
from an emphasis on accuracy in habeas jurisprudence - an empirically demonstrable implication of a new rule - on the basis of such a
62
fear is implausible indeed.
this approach to habeas doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note; the Note assumes that Justice
Harlan's view of the purpose of the writ informed his analysis in Desist and Mackey and therefore informs the Court's standards for collateral retroactivity today. In addition, it bears noting
that, whether Justice Brennan's view of the purpose of the writ was normatively or descriptively
persuasive, supporters of that approach must concede that the Court's collateral retroactivity jurisprudence during that era was unsuccessful in fulfilling this purpose due to its failure to provide
a functional means for disciplining state courts.
59 See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 685-86 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part); see also THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 4,
at 1315 (noting that "Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Fay v. Noia rejected [a view of habeas
based upon the accuracy of the underlying criminal procedure] .. .which Justice Harlan[] .. .for

the most part embraced" (citation omitted)).
60 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 694-95 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting
in part) (citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1(I970)); see also Coleman, 399 U.S. at 19 (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing disappointment at his inability to effect
reconsideration of several of the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions).
61 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in
part).
62 Of course, reasonable jurists might disagree with respect to whether a particular procedure
is likely to enhance the accuracy of a judgment of conviction. Compare Schriro v. Summerlin, 124
S. Ct. 2519, 2525 (2004) (holding that jury determination of sentencing factors is not central to the
accuracy of that determination), with id. at 2527 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that juries are
likely to improve accuracy). And certainly an assessment with respect to whether a particular
procedure improves accuracy involves some subjective judgment regarding the value of the procedure - although the use of empirical analysis might reduce the indeterminacy of that assess-
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All three reasons indicate that Justice Harlan's rejection of the
analysis he set forth so forcefully in Desist was occasioned not only by
his efforts to constrain the retroactive applicability of the Warren
Court's new rules of criminal procedure, but also by his adherence to
the view that habeas should lie to ensure that a conviction was consistent with the procedural protections afforded defendants by the Constitution. Seeking a more limiting construction than he had set forth in
Desist, Justice Harlan found a more restrictive test in Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut.63 In Palko, the Court had refused to incorporate the Double Jeopardy Clause against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that the Amendment
guaranteed only those rights "so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. '64 Palko's test for incorporation, Justice Harlan argued in Mackey, "more correctly
mark[ed] the tipping point of finality interests . . . in terms of divining

which new rules should apply on habeas.

'65

B. Teague v. Lane and the Substantive Meaning of the Mackey Prong
Notwithstanding Justice Harlan's protestations, Stovall's approach
remained the law of habeas retroactivity until 1989, when a fourJustice plurality finally managed to reject that approach in Teague v.
Lane. In Teague, the prisoner's habeas petition asserted that the jury
in his trial had been assembled in a racially discriminatory manner
violative of the Court's holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 66 even though
Batson was decided after his conviction became final .6 Because the
Court had previously determined that Batson constituted a "new" rule
of criminal procedure, 68 at issue in Teague was whether such a new
rule should apply retroactively on collateral review.
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion began with a lengthy discussion of Justice Harlan's "general rule of nonretroactivity for cases on
collateral review. '69 The plurality formally "adopt[ed] Justice Harlan's

ment. Putting these difficult issues to one side, this Note argues that a focus on accuracy at a
minimum guides jurists toward the concerns that validate the existence of habeas review in the
first instance - especially when contrasted with a fully subjective inquiry regarding those jurists'
conceptions of what is essential to "ordered liberty."
63 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
64 Id. at 325 (quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 0936); Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); and Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)) (internal quotation

mark omitted).
65 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in
part).
66 476 U.S. 79 (I986) (overruling, in part, Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
67 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 293-94 (1989).
68 See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258 (1986).
69 Teague, 489 U.S. at 305-07.
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view of retroactivity for cases on collateral review,"70 articulating an
exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity in cases where the
procedural rule at issue was held to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'" The plurality was careful, however, to note that it
adopted Justice Harlan's formulation of the exception "with a modification. '7 2 Tracing the shift from Justice Harlan's emphasis on accuracy in Desist to his invocation of the incorporation test in Palko, Justice O'Connor determined that the test for retroactivity of new
constitutional rules on collateral review would adopt accuracy as its
touchstone:
We believe it desirable to combine the accuracy element of the Desist version of the second exception with the Mackey requirement that the procedure at issue must implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial. Were
we to employ the Palko test without more, we would be doing little more
than importing into a very different context the terms of the debate over

incorporation. Reviving the Palko test now, in this area of law, would be
73
unnecessarily anachronistic.

The Teague Court's unfortunate adoption of the Mackey prong
makes Teague's functional meaning virtually indecipherable. It is
clear, for example, that the Mackey prong cannot function as Justice
Harlan proposed - as a bar to retroactivity for any right that would
not have survived Justice Cardozo's test for incorporation. Such an
approach would render the Desist prong mere surplusage, for Justice
Cardozo's test would almost certainly exclude every modern rule of
criminal procedure from retroactive application without respect to its
74
accuracy-enhancing properties.
70

Id. at 307-08.

Id. at 305-07 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (i97) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937))) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a matter of technical parlance, it should
be noted that the exception to collateral nonretroactivity that this Note describes is generally referred to as the "second" Teague exception. The "first" exception concerns new rules that place
"certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe." Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part)). Because Justice Harlan's jurisprudence is
far more revealing with respect to the second exception than the first, whether Apprendi might be
held retroactive under this "first" exception to habeas nonretroactivity is beyond the scope of this
Note. See Coleman v. United States, 329 F.3 d 77, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (Parker, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that Apprendi should apply retroactively under the first exception because it
"alter[ed] the meaning of a criminal statute" by characterizing sentencing factors as elements of a
crime). For an analysis as to whether substantive changes in law in fact "fall[] under an exception
to Teague[]" or are "more accurately characterized as substantive rules not subject to the bar," see
Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2522 n.4 (2004).
72 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
73 Id. at 312 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
74 Cf.Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (holding that the right to a jury trial, the indictment requirement,
and immunity from compulsory self-incrimination "might be lost, and justice still be done").
71
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It is equally clear, however, that the Mackey prong cannot be read
simply to make retroactivity coterminous with the current state of incorporation doctrine. Such a test would exclude virtually no right
from retroactive application because the incorporation of the Amendments is virtually complete.75 And because Justice Harlan authored
Mackey in 1971 - having fought and lost the incorporation battle
with respect to several constitutional rights 76 - it is doubtful that the
Mackey prong would limit retroactive application of any new rule if it
were understood to refer only to those rights already incorporated at
the time of the Mackey opinion itself.
What Teague leaves us with, then, is a test that combines Desist's
well-understood assessment of accuracy and Mackey's virtually indeterminate reference to "procedures that ... are 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty."'' 77 Crucially, however, the plurality anticipated the
"anachronistic" heritage of Palko - and resisted a return to an indeterminate jurisprudence of unknown jurists' substantive values:
[S]ince Mackey was decided, our cases have moved in the direction of reaffirming the relevance of the likely accuracy of convictions in determining
the available scope of habeas review .... Justice Harlan's concerns about

[the pliability of such a test] can be addressed by limiting the scope of the
second exception to those new procedures without which the likelihood of
78
an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.
In view of the indeterminacy of the Mackey prong, courts should
approach retroactivity in a manner that focuses on this critical passage
in Teague. As the Court's jurisprudence after Teague makes clear, emphasizing the implications of a particular rule for the accuracy of the
underlying proceedings is far more helpful in striking the difficult balance between concerns of finality and the purpose of the writ than
vague reference to a particular jurist's "concept of ordered liberty."
C. Post-TeagueJurisprudence
Since deciding Teague, the Court has declined to apply eleven new
rules of criminal procedure retroactively on collateral review. 79 The
Court has variously relied on the analysis in Desist or Mackey - or,
80
occasionally, an amalgam of both - to reject petitioners' claims.
75 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 & nn.4-12 (1968) (collecting cases).
76 See, e.g., Washington v.Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 24 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539-45 (ig6I) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (197) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325).
78 Teague, 489 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
79 See United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3 d 519, 529 (2d Cir. 2000) (collecting ten such cases);
see also Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2526 (2004).
80 In one of these post-Teague cases, the petitioner failed to argue that the exception to
Teague's bar applied to his case, and the Court therefore declined to provide a detailed assessment
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In Butler v. McKellar,8 ' the Court relied explicitly and exclusively
on Desist to reject a claim for retroactive application of a new rule on
collateral review. There, the Court concluded that the rule of Arizona
v. Roberson,82 which held that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the police from reinitiating interrogation with respect to a separate offense
after a suspect has requested counsel, was unavailable retroactively on
habeas. 3 The Court explained that "a violation of Roberson's added
restrictions on police investigat[ions] would not seriously diminish the
likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination. 8 4 Among the
eleven collateral retroactivity cases decided since 1989, at least five, including Butler, rest exclusively on the Court's conclusion that the rule
at issue was not "so central to an accurate determination of innocence
or guilt as to fall within th[e] exception to the Teague bar. '8 5 Because
these decisions adhere closely to Justice Harlan's view that the decisive
factor in determining whether to apply a procedural rule retroactively
is the rule's implications for the accuracy of the underlying conviction,
these decisions are fully consonant with the reassessment of retroactivity counseled by this Note.
Other decisions in the post-Teague era appear to use a consolidated
version of the Desist and Mackey tests to preclude retroactive applica8 6
tion of rules on collateral review. In Saffle v. Parks,
for example, the
Court held that a new rule prohibiting a prosecutor from arguing before capital-sentencing jurors that sympathy should not influence their
judgment would not have been 87 retroactively available on collateral
review because, "[w]hatever one may think of the importance of [the]
with respect to the scope of the exception and its applicability in that case. See Lambrix v.
Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 539-40 (1997).
81 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
82 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
83 Butler, 494 U.S. at 416.
84 Id.
85 Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 120 (1995) (per curiam) (citation omitted) (quoting Graham
v. Collins, 5o6 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989))) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (holding that the Eighth Circuit could not retroactively apply a new
procedural rule guaranteeing a former fugitive's right to appeal); see also Schriro v. Summerlin,
124 S. Ct. 2519, 2525 (2004) (refusing to apply the rule of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),
retroactively); Caspari v. Bohlen, 5 10 U.S. 383, 396 (1994) (holding that an extension of Bullington
v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (98), to prohibit a successive noncapital sentencing enhancement
would have been retroactively unavailable on habeas review because the existing rule would "enhance the accuracy of the proceeding" (emphasis added)); Graham, 506 U.S. at 478 (refusing to
apply the rule of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), retroactively).
86 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
87 This analysis is posed in the hypothetical because Teague requires that the Court "refuse to
announce a new rule in a given case unless the rule would be applied retroactively to the defendant in the case." Teague, 489 U.S. at 316. Thus, in any case that urges a new rule and arrives at
the Court on collateral review, the Court will refuse to announce the rule unless it would pass
Teague's bar for retroactive application. Id. But see id. at 319 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
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proposed rule, it has none of the primacy and centrality of the rule
adopted in Gideon. '88 But the Saffle Court also indicated that the "objectives of fairness and accuracy [were] more likely to be threatened
than promoted by" the proposed rule, and the Court therefore rejected
the petitioner's claims to retroactive relief on both Desist and Mackey
89
grounds.
In another post-Teague case, O'Dell v. Netherland,90 the Court refused to apply retroactively the rule of Simmons v. South Carolina,9 1
which required that a capital defendant be permitted to inform a sentencing jury that he will be ineligible for parole if the prosecution refers to his future dangerousness. There, too, the majority asserted
that, unlike "the sweeping rule of Gideon,"92 the Simmons rule "has
hardly 'alter[ed] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' essential to the fairness of a proceeding. '93 But, in a footnote
at the end of its retroactivity analysis, the Court added that it was "by
no means inevitable" that "miscarriage[s] of justice" would occur without retroactive application of the rule - indicating that the rule's ambiguous effect on accuracy provided an alternative basis for the
Court's holding. 94 That the Court failed even to identify whether its
conclusion rested on the Desist or the Mackey analysis - or both - is
demonstrative of the confusion that has attended the Court's occasional invocation of Mackey.
Indeed, only three post-Teague holdings rejecting retroactive application of a new rule on collateral review can be said to rest exclusively
on the Mackey prong. In Sawyer v. Smith,95 the Court concluded that
the rule of Caldwell v. Mississippi,96 which held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of a death sentence where the
sentencing authority has been led to the false belief that responsibility
for determining the capital sentence lay elsewhere, did not fit Teague's
exception for new procedural rules. 97 The Court explained that the petitioner's argument that retroactive application of Caldwell's rule

88 Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495.

89 Id. (emphasis added).
90 521 U.S. 151 (1997).
91 512 U.S. 154 (994).
92 O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 167.
93 Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242
(iggo) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. 667, 693 (I971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part)))).
94 See id. at 167 n.4 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 35, O'Dell (No. 966867)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95 497 U.S. 227 (,990).
96 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
97 Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 245.
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would "preserve the accuracy and fairness of capital sentencing judgments"9 8
looks only to half of our definition of the second exception.... It is
...not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at improving
the accuracy of trial. More is required. A rule that qualifies under this
exception must not only improve accuracy, but also "'alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements"' essential to the fairness of a proceeding. 99
It might be argued, then, that Sawyer stands starkly for the proposition that Mackey's analysis independently excludes rules from retroactive application when the rule in question does not "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of
a proceeding." But Sawyer is also amenable to a narrower reading that the Mackey prong only does this work when the petitioner, by the
very nature of his constitutional claim, must concede that the new rule
is not essential to the fairness of the proceeding. The Sawyer majority
specifically noted that "[t]he only defendants [seeking retroactive application of Caldwell] . . . are those who must concede that the [error]
was not so harmful as to render their sentencing trial 'fundamentally
unfair,"' and thus concluded that the petitioner definitionally could not
meet Mackey's requirement. 10 0
The second post-Teague case suggesting that the Mackey prong operates independently is Gray v. Netherland, 01 in which the Court
made no mention of accuracy while refusing to apply a proposed new
rule retroactively, referring only to Saffle's admonition that such a rule
would have had "none of the primacy and centrality of the rule
adopted in Gideon."1°2 The Gray Court, however, referred neither to
Mackey nor to Desist, and it is not clear whether the language of
"primacy and centrality" refers to one or both prongs of the analysis.

98 Id. at 242 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 30, Sawyer (No. 89-5809)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
99 Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part))).
100 Id. at 243-44 (quoting Sawyerv. Butler, 881 F.2d i273, 1293 (5th Cir. 1989)). The petitioner
in Sawyer was forced to concede that he could not show that the absence of Caldwell's protections
rendered his trial fundamentally unfair because Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,416 U.S. 637 (I974),
provided relief for any petitioner able to make such a showing. The Sawyer Court therefore relied heavily on the fact that, "[a]t the time of [the] petitioner's trial and appeal, the rule of Donnelly was in place to protect any defendant who could show that [a constitutional violation at
trial] had in fact made a proceeding fundamentally unfair." Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 243. Because
Sawyer did not "contest[] the Court of Appeals' finding that he ha[d] no claim for relief under the
Donnelly standard," id., the Court concluded that he was logically precluded from making the
showing required by Mackey. See id. at 244.
101 518 U.S. 152 (1996).
102 Id. at 170 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
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Similarly, in a third case, Gilmore v. Taylor,10 3 the Court refused to
apply retroactively a proposed rule of criminal procedure requiring
that juries be instructed to consider a murder defendant's mitigating
mental state, concluding that the second Teague exception was "inapplicable. ' 10 4 As in Gray, however, the Court made no mention of
Mackey; and, although Justices Blackmun and Stevens argued that the
proposed rule met Teague's strictures, 105 the Court responded with the
vague assertion that the rule was not "so fundamental as to come
within Teague's second exception."'10 6 Although Gilmore appears to
have relied on the Court's conception of "those procedures that ... are
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"' 1 7 it is arguable that the
Court relied upon both the Mackey and Desist prongs to reject the petitioner's claim.
This review of the eleven post-Teague cases suggests that the few
doctrinal hurdles to discarding Mackey's unhelpful reference to the incorporation debate might easily be overcome. And a recent case,
Schriro v. Summerlin,'0 8 provides hope that the Court has returned to
accuracy as the exclusive touchstone for collateral retroactivity.

III. APPRENDI AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
FOR DECISIONAL ACCURACY
This Part applies the Note's proposed rethinking of collateral retroactivity to the Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. The Note
then explains that this approach to retroactivity would render Apprendi v. New Jersey retroactive, and that this result is fully consistent
with the Court's decision in Schriro v. Summerlin.
A. Apprendi and Its HistoricalRoots
In 2000, the Court announced in Apprendi what has been judged
by every federal court of appeals to consider the issue to be a new rule
of criminal procedure:' 0 9 "any fact (other than prior conviction) that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable

103 508 U.S. 333 (1993).
104 Id. at 345.
105
106

Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Gilmore, 508 U.S. at 345 n.4.

107 Id. at 345 (quoting Graham v. Collins, 5o6 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (937))))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2525 (2004).
109 See, e.g., Coleman v. United States, 329 F.3 d 77, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 840
(2003) (collecting seven such cases and "join[ing] the chorus").
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doubt." 110 In so concluding, the Court invalidated a conviction obtained by a New Jersey procedure that allowed a judge, rather than a
jury, to enhance the defendant's sentence "if the trial judge [found], by
a preponderance of the evidence," that the defendant acted with a
purpose to intimidate an individual on the basis of race. 1 1
Critically, the Apprendi Court made clear that the New Jersey procedure violated two of Apprendi's constitutional rights: the jury right
enshrined in the Sixth Amendment and the right to have every fact
necessary to his sentence proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 112 The
Court emphasized that the reasonable doubt standard, a requirement
of due process since In re Winship,"3 plays a critical functional role
with respect to the accuracy of criminal trials.
In Winship, the Court considered New York's juvenile delinquency
statute, which permitted a court to make a finding of delinquency by a
preponderance of the evidence. 14 Striking down the statute, the Court
explained that the "prime" purpose of the reasonable doubt rule is "reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error."' s Thus, the
Winship Court held, "the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
' 116
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. "
Justice Harlan joined the opinion of the Court, but he wrote separately to explicate the concerns that motivated his rare agreement with
the Warren Court majority. First, his concurring opinion noted that,
"in a judicial proceeding... the factfinder cannot acquire unassailably
accurate knowledge of what happened"; and, as a consequence, the
standard of proof "represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in
the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication."' 17 Second, Justice Harlan recognized that any trier of fact, under any procedure, will be exposed to the possibility of arriving at erroneous factual conclusions - in the criminal context, the acquittal of
a guilty person or the conviction of an innocent one. "The standard of
proof," Justice Harlan explained, "influences the relative frequency of
these two types of erroneous outcomes," and as a consequence "the

110 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (200o) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
n.6 (1999)).
111 Id. at 468-69 (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp.

227, 243

1999-2000)).

112 Id. at 476-77, 497.

113
114
115
116
117

397 U.S. 358 (1970)See id. at 36o.
Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
Id. at 364.
Id. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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should, in a rational world, reflect an as-

sessment of the comparative social disutility of each."' 18

B. The Effects of the Reasonable Doubt Standard
on Harlanesque Accuracy
It is clear that both Justice Harlan and the contemporary Court
agree that the reasonable doubt standard unambiguously and significantly improves the accuracy of the convictions to which it is applied.
Indeed, a comparison of Justice Harlan's Winship concurrence to Professor Mishkin's analysis reveals that the Justice understood the reasonable doubt standard as among those accuracy-enhancing procedures that demand retroactive application.
Professor Mishkin described the notion of increased procedural accuracy as expressing "that degree of confidence that a man has committed a crime which the Constitution requires as a condition of the
state's depriving him of liberty or life."119 For this reason, Professor
Mishkin intimated, "habeas corpus [should] assess the validity of a
conviction, no matter how long past, by any current constitutional
standards which have an intended effect of enhancing the reliability of
the guilt-determining process."12 0 The parallels between Professor
Mishkin's analysis and Justice Harlan's concurrence in Winship are
striking but unsurprising. Justice Harlan viewed proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the Constitution's "instruct[ion to] the factfinder conin
cerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have
121
the correctness of factual conclusions" supporting a guilty verdict.
There can be very little doubt that Justice Harlan would have
agreed that Winship's command represents the quintessential accuracy-improving procedural rule. By definition, the reasonable doubt
standard reflects the level of proof that the Constitution demands to
"assure that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which
creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted.' 22 For Justice Harlan - and, one hopes, for the current Justices - this is precisely the risk that the Great Writ was conceived to
eliminate. Because the Teague plurality "agree[d] with Justice Harlan's
description of the function of habeas corpus,' 1 23 fidelity to Justice

Harlan's functional view demands retroactive application of Apprendi's reasonable doubt requirement.

118
119
120
121
122
123

Id. at 371.
Mishkin, supra note 43, at 81 (emphasis added).
Id. at 82.
Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 3o8 (1989) (emphasis added).
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It could be argued that Apprendi need not apply retroactively because it extends Winship's holding only to "sentencing factors" rather
than to "elements" of the crime. But this argument forgets that Apprendi eliminates this distinction for constitutional purposes. Because
due process requires that all "facts that expose a defendant to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally proscribed" must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, 124 it is difficult indeed to argue that punishments imposed in violation of Apprendi's requirement can stand.
Because all of these sentences are shrouded by the constitutional doubt
that attends a punishment imposed solely on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence, even the strongest interests in finality cannot justify continued imprisonment of these defendants.
That the Court decided unanimously, before Teague, to apply Winship retroactively further supports this conclusion. 12 The Court recognized that trials proceeding in the absence of Winship's protections
"so raise[] serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts" that
"[n]either good-faith reliance by state or federal authorities on prior
constitutional law or accepted practice"126is an adequate replacement for
full retroactive application of the right.
It might also be argued that Apprendi's insistence that the reasonable doubt standard reach every fact determinative to a defendant's
punishment is not the type of "fundamental" rule that qualifies for
Teague's exception. That these arguments have proven convincing to
eight courts of appeals is not indicative of their power; rather, it is demonstrative of the confusion that currently plagues collateral retroactivity jurisprudence.
C. The Mackey Prong's Consequencesfor Clarity in the Courts Below
Eight circuits have concluded that, under Teague, the rule of Apprendi is not retroactively available on collateral review. 127 Every cir124 Apprendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466, 483 (2000).
125 Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 205 (972)

(per curiam).

It should be noted,

however, that Ivan V applied Winship retroactively on direct review and was decided before
Teague. Some observers have suggested that Ivan V cannot survive Teague's modification of retroactivity doctrine. Compare Charles F. Baird, The Habeas Corpus Revolution: A New Role for
State Courts, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 297, 324 n.195 (i996) (suggesting that Ivan V and similar cases
might have been decided differently under the Teague rule), with THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 1375-76 (discussing Teague's significant effect on the

availability of habeas relief under new rules in view of the standard of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 87 0977)). Nevertheless, during a period when the Court thought the tests for direct and
collateral retroactivity coterminous, see Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300 (1967), it is striking
that the Court unanimously agreed that Winship applied retroactively.
126 Ivan V, 407 U.S. at 204 (quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (197)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127 Coleman v. United States, 329 F3d 77, 88-90 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 840
(2003); United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3 d 139, 147-51 ( 4 th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1032
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cuit so concluding has indicated that, although Apprendi significantly

"'improv[es] the accuracy' of criminal proceedings,"'1 28 its rule does not

"'alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential
12 9
to the fairness' of those proceedings.
One circuit has interpreted Teague as requiring a "groundbreaking
occurrence" for retroactive application of a new rule on collateral review; 130 another has asserted that only a holding by the Supreme
Court "that the country's criminal justice system malfunctioned ... fundamentally prior to [the new rule would] merit
... retroactive application.' 13 1 Exposing the source of the difficulty,

another circuit has argued that "one can easily envision a system of
'ordered liberty' in which certain elements of a crime" need not be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.13 2 On this standard, however, it is
clear that Gideon, too, would not be retroactively applied on collateral
review; surely one could envision a system of ordered liberty that did
not require the assistance of counsel in every criminal case. (Indeed,
several such systems existed for more than a century after the Founding.) Although the indeterminacy of the Mackey prong may make the
courts of appeals' task in evaluating Apprendi's retroactive application
more difficult, these opinions offer no reasoned 33
justification regardless
of the doctrinal limits of collateral retroactivity.1
(2OO); Goode v. United States, 305 F.3d 378, 382-85 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1O96
(2002); Curtis v. United States, 294 F. 3 d 841, 843-44 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 976
(2002); United States v. Moss, 252 F. 3 d 993, 997-1OOI (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1097
(2002); United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F. 3 d 664, 668-71 ( 9 th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 939 (2002); United States v. Mora, 293 F 3 d 1213, 1218-i9 (ioth Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 961 (2002); McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1255-59 (iith Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536
U.S. 9o6 (2002).
128 Coleman, 329 F. 3 d at 88 (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241-42 (1990)).
129 Id. (quoting Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971))) (emphasis omitted)).
130 Id. (quoting United States v. Mandanici, 2o5 F 3 d 519, 528 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Caspari
v. Bohlen, 51o U.S. 383, 396 (199))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
131 Sanders, 247 F.3d at 15o.
132 MOSS, 252 F. 3 d at 999 (quoting United States v. Shunk, 113 F.3 d 31, 37 (5 th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133 Although this Note argues that Apprendi provides the Court with an important opportunity

to guide lower courts by explicitly decreasing its reliance on Mackey's substantively unhelpful
guideposts, even those who would insist that the law of retroactivity retain Mackey's test should
agree that Apprendi must be applied retroactively. Although it is clear that Teague's reference to
Palko's standard of "ordered liberty" cannot reasonably be understood to import the terms of the
incorporation debate at the time of Cardozo or Harlan, see supra pp. 1651-52, it is equally clear
that the Teague plurality thought itself borrowing directly from the "language used by Justice
Harlan." Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. And Justice Harlan's concurrence in Winship reveals that he
thought of the reasonable doubt standard as a protection of a defendant's "transcending value
... [in] his liberty," In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted), and that no less
than 'fundamental proceduralfairness" demanded that Winship's rule be applied to every fact
relevant to a defendant's punishment, id. (emphasis added). Thus, even assuming the continued
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The courts of appeals' struggle to avoid retroactive application of
Apprendi and its progeny might be explained by the significant costs
such a holding would impose upon state governments, which would be
required to relitigate thousands of prisoners' sentences if Apprendi
were applied retroactively. 134 Although the benefits of finality are certainly a valid consideration in habeas jurisprudence as a normative
matter, Teague - unlike the earlier test set forth in Stovall - made no
mention of administrative cost as a factor to be considered in determining the scope of collateral retroactivity. Further, courts should remember that Congress is free to circumscribe collateral retroactivity by
statute. Congress has not acted to limit collateral retroactivity on the
basis of administrative cost. 135 If the costs of collateral retroactivity
are motivating lower courts to dismiss habeas petitions, jurists should
candidly acknowledge that fact while inviting empirical analysis of
those costs, rather than accepting without more the imagined administrative catastrophe described by states seeking to avoid the reach of
the writ.

vitality of the Mackey prong, it is difficult to understand why Gideon should be thought more
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" than Winship and Apprendi.
134 Observers have also argued that the Court's narrow approach to collateral retroactivity enables judges seeking to expand constitutional rights to assure their colleagues that newly conceived constitutional rules will have only limited implications because they will not affect existing
convictions. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1739 ("It was much easier for the Court to
lay down the Miranda rules, for example, knowing that the prison doors need not necessarily
swing open for every inmate convicted with the aid of confessions not preceded by the requisite
warnings.'). On this theory, the Mackey prong serves to provide courts with "wiggle room" to
accommodate jurists prepared to extend constitutional rights in prospective cases but unwilling to
accept the consequences of such a decision for those already convicted. This Note has argued
that the history of the writ demands that an extension of constitutional rights necessary to improve significantly the accuracy of future punishment is equally necessary to ensure the accuracy
of ongoing punishment. However, if retroactivity jurisprudence indeed reflects judges' preference
to define most constitutional rules of criminal procedure prospectively, this Note argues that
courts should do so explicitly rather than under the guise of an ill-defined conception of fundamental rights.
135 It might be argued that Congress has already barred Apprendi from retroactive application
on habeas through 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), which limits grants of the writ to cases in which a prisoner
is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," as construed in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (977), which requires a showing of "cause and
prejudice" to excuse a procedural default of a constitutional claim. Although the Court has held
that the novelty of a constitutional claim may constitute cause, see Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. I, 13
(1984), it is at least arguable that Apprendi was not sufficiently new to justify a failure to raise an
analogous claim during state proceedings, and that most Apprendi claims are therefore barred
under § 2254(a) as procedurally defaulted unless prejudice or cause can be shown under Wainwright. Cf THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 1374.
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D. Schriro v. Summerlin and the Prospect of Clarity
The Court's recent decision in Schriro v. Summerlin, holding that
the rule of Ring v. Arizona 136 is not retroactively available on collateral
review, 137 provides some hope that the Court may finally have discarded Mackey's untethered standard in exchange for nearly exclusive
emphasis on decisional accuracy. The rule of Ring - itself an extension of Apprendi to a death penalty procedure empowering a judge to
find aggravating factors that made a defendant eligible for capital
punishment - holds that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury
138
make these findings.
In Summerlin, a prisoner sought retroactive application of Ring's
rule to invalidate a capital sentence imposed after judicial factfinding
made him eligible for the death penalty.139 Assessing whether Ring
should be applied retroactively, Justice Scalia heavily emphasized Justice Harlan's Desist dissent and concluded:
[T]he question is whether judicial factfinding [rather than jury factfinding]
so "seriously diminishe[s]" accuracy that there is an "'impermissibly large
risk"' of punishing conduct the law does not140reach. The evidence is simply too equivocal to support that conclusion.
Although the majority and dissent disagreed with respect to whether
jury factfinding enhanced the accuracy of the underlying proceedings,
they appeared to agree that "protecting the innocent against erroneous
14 1
conviction" was among the Great Writ's "basic objectives.'
Summerlin, then, is perhaps indicative of an emerging consensus at
the Court to take seriously Teague's admonition that it "would be unnecessarily anachronistic" to import Palko's analysis into retroactivity
doctrine.1 42 Drawing from Teague's suggestion that the Court should
balance the state's interest in finality by "limiting the scope of the
...
exception to those new procedures without which the likelihood of
an accurate conviction is seriously diminished,"'143 the Summerlin
Court suggested that the new rule must inarguably improve the accuracy of every conviction to which it is applied.
Arguments that Summerlin's outcome suggests that the Court will
similarly deny retroactive effect to the reasonable doubt holding of Ap-

136 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
137

Schriro v. Summerlin,

124 S. Ct. 2519, 2526 (2004).

138 Ring, 536 U.S. at 6o9.

139 See Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2521.

140 Id. at 2525 (third alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 312-13 (1989) (emphasis added) (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969)

(Harlan, J., dissenting))).
141 Id. at 2528 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142 Teague, 489 U.S. at 312.
143 Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
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prendi ignore that Ring did not implicate Winship in any way. 144 Because the implications of the jury right for decisional accuracy are in
fact ambiguous, Summerlin's holding is fully consonant with the reassessment of retroactivity counseled in this Note. Indeed, because the
analysis set forth here requires an exclusive focus on the accuracy implications of a new constitutional rule, rethinking retroactivity in this
manner would not require revisiting Summerlin. To the contrary, the
Summerlin Court's near-exclusive emphasis on considerations of accuracy strongly suggests that the Winship right guaranteed in Apprendi
should survive the Court's retroactivity analysis. Because only Apprendi's reasonable doubt guarantee unambiguously improves the accuracy of underlying criminal proceedings, only that guarantee - and
not the jury right implicated in Ring and Summerlin - should be retroactively available on collateral attack.
IV. CONCLUSION

The much-maligned rule of Teague v. Lane has yielded an indeterminate doctrine of collateral retroactivity that has strayed some distance from its jurisprudential roots. Drawing on the history of the
Teague test and Justice Harlan's substantial influence on its development, this Note has argued that Teague's retention of Mackey's references to unpredictable notions of fundamental fairness has incorporated policy considerations - including a jurist's sympathy for the
procedural rule itself - that are out of place in the habeas context.
Fidelity to Teague's jurisprudential roots would shift the emphasis to
whether a new rule implicates the accuracy of the proceedings, an approach that is both consistent with the Court's post-Teague jurisprudence and more closely tied to Justice Harlan's conception of the functional purpose of the Great Writ.
In view of these considerations, this Note has argued that retroactive application of the reasonable doubt holding of Apprendi v. New
Jersey provides a welcome opportunity for the Court to refocus its jurisprudence on those procedures that significantly improve the accuracy of criminal punishment. The courts of appeals' doctrinal struggle
with this question indicates that the Court's existing jurisprudence
144 The procedure at issue in Ring required the judge making sentencing findings to do so beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not implicate Apprendi's reasonable doubt protections.
See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 (2002). Most commentators have agreed that Summerlin
has no analytical implication for Apprendi's collateral retroactivity because, as this Note argues, it
is the Winship right, rather than the Sixth Amendment right, that most implicates the values consistent with a grant of the writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 36, 323-25 (2004) (distinguishing Summerlin's analysis from an assessment of the retroactivity of Apprendi and concluding that "the Court in
Summerlin addressed only the retroactivity of the right-to-jury holding of Ring").
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provides little guidance. A review of Justice Harlan's approach, however, suggests that even his narrowest conception of retroactivity
would counsel retroactive application of Apprendi's reasonable doubt
requirement.
Although collateral retroactivity jurisprudence requires a difficult
balance between the states' interest in finality and individual defendants' substantive rights, habeas must ensure - as Justice Harlan
recognized - that the judgment of each conviction in the United
States meets the standard of certainty demanded by the Constitution.
Because a higher standard of proof directly serves this purpose, the
Court's extension of this standard to sentencing factors must be given
retroactive application to defendants whose punishment extends beyond the maximum legally authorized sentence based solely upon facts
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

